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has once again been effected. 1' 7 The result is further encroachment
5
upon rights reserved to the states ' 0L-a
trend which has characterized
recent decisions of the Supreme Court ' 9 -thus driving another
"vital blow to the very heart and framework of our constitutional
republic." 110

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES AND THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION

Introduction

[T]he privilege against self-incrimination is one of the
great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized."' The
realization of this privilege was the outgrowth of the long conflict
between those who championed the spirit of individual liberty on the
one hand and the advocates of the "collective power" of the state on
the other.2 Though, by its terms, the applicability of the constitutional provision was limited to criminal cases,3 it was not long before
the courts held that it could be invoked in any federal government
proceeding where the evidence thus secured might later be used to
convict the witness of a federal crime. 4 Thus, today, the privilege, if
properly invoked, will excuse one from answering questions posed in
civil cases, 5 before grand juries 6 and in depositions, 7 and also from
107 See
TION

POWELL, VAGARIES

AND VARIETIES

IN

CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETA-

28-33 (1956); Vaught, Amending the Constitution by Judicial Decree,

9 OKLA. L. REv. 249 (1956).
108 "It will be said that this latest development [the report of the Ullnann

case at trial level] is a dangerous usurpation of state's rights. The accuracy of
this statement will not be disputed, but in view of the past decisions of the
Supreme Court. it would seem clear that the constitutional validity of this
amendment to the statute will also be upheld by that court." 9 Sw. L.J. 474,
476 (1955).
109 See, e.g., Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956);
Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
110 Cook and Potter, The School Segregation Cases: Opposing the Opinion
of the Supreme Court, 42 A.B.A.J. 313, 391 (1956).
1 GRISWOLD, THE FFIH AMENDMENT TODAY 7 (1955).
2 See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 637 (1896) (dissenting opinion).
s " .. nor shall any person... be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself.. . ." U.S. CoNsr. amend. V (emphasis added).
4 See McCoRmIcK, EvIDENcE 259 (1954); Finkelhor and Stockdale, The
Professor and the Fifth Amendment, 16 U. PITr. L. REv. 344, 352 (1955) ; see
also cases cited notes 5-9 infra.
5 See McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924).
6 See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892); United States v.
Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1943) (dictum).
7 See Phleps v. Phleps, 133 N.J. Eq. 392, 32 A.2d 81, .83 (Ct. Err. & App.
1943) (dictum).
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refusing to furnish testimony in hearings before legislative committees 8 and administrative boards. 9 Of equal import, as a factor
in elevating this constitutional safeguard to the lofty status it enjoys
today has been the oft repeated, though tenuous, utterances of judges
in explanation of the privilege. Two corollary views have ensued;
first, that the privilege serves to protect not only the guilty but the
innocent; 10 secondly, that no presumption of guilt or perjury arises
from its invocation."1 Together with the expanded scope attributed
to the privilege, 12 these two views have served to make it an effective
shield against the inquisitorial powers of the state.
That the significance of the privilege has reached gigantic proportions in contemporary society may properly be attributed to the
increased use of the investigative power by modern legislatures. Since
1939 there has been an increasing concern about the possible presence
of disloyal personnel in government employment.' 3 The zealous efforts
of the House Committee on Un-American Activities and the Senate
Sub-Committee on Internal Security set off a drive to purge the federal service of disloyal and subversive officers and employees. In recent years, however, the work of these committees has been impeded
by the long chain of witnesses called before them who have exercised
their privilege against self-incrimination.' 4 Aside from this problem,
however, the frequent invocation of the privilege by government employees hinders the exercise of three important governmental functions. The gathering of information by legislative committees and
grand juries is made more difficult; the prosecution of public employees for crimes committed during their employment is impeded;
and the removal of corrupt and disloyal personnel from the public service is less easily accomplished. In answer to these problems, government has devised four methods of discouraging the exercise of the
privilege. The granting of immunity from prosecution in return for
compelled testimony has perhaps enjoyed the most widespread use
among these methods.1 5 The theory of the immunity statute is that
8 See United States v. DiCarlo, 102 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Ohio 1952).

9 See Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137 (1949).
Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 557-58
(1956) ; Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956) ; Burdick v. United
10 See, e.g.,

States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915);

GRISWOLD,, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY

9

(1955).
-1 See, e.g., Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., supra note 10; Ullmann
v. United States, supra note 10; Davis v. University of Kansas City, 129 F.
Supp. 716, 718 (W.D. Mo. 1955); Faxon v. School Comm., 331 Mass. 531,

120 N.E.2d 772, 774 (1954); In re Fenn, 235 Mo. App. 24, 128 S.W.2d 657,
664 (1939) (per curiam).
12 See Pittman, The Fifth Amendment: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow,
42 A.B.A.J. 509 (1956) ; Comment, 1955 U. ILL. L. FoRum 611, 612.
13 See Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 126 (1951).
14 See Brownell, Immunity from Prosecution Versus Privilege Against SelfIncrimination, 28 Tur. L. REv. 1 (1953); Finkelhor and Stockdale, The Professor and the Fifth Amendment, 16 U. Pir. L. REv. 344, 344-45 (1955).
25 E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (Supp. II 1954) ; N.Y. P-N. LAw §§ 381, 584, 2447.
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if the threat of prosecution is removed the justification for the exercise of the privilege ceases, and thus the witness must legally answer.
A second device is the requiring of a waiver of immunity as a condition of continuing employment. 16 Closely resembling it is the proposed requirement that an applicant for a government job waive his
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.' 7 Waiver provisions have been used widely in many jurisdictions and appear to
present no serious constitutional question. The fourth means used
by state and local governments to facilitate the performance of the
governmental functions discussed above is the dismissal of the employee for refusing to answer self-incriminatory questions. This
method forms the basis of the problems discussed in this note, and
will be explained more fully below.
Government Employment
Nearly 2,500,000 civilians work for the federal government.1 8
In 1947 the Census Bureau reported that 6,000,000 men and women
were employed by our federal, state and local governments. 9 From
a standpoint of policy as well as law the status and rights of such a
large number of persons has posed many problems. Because of their
relation to the government, these employees are subject to limitations
not applicable to other citizens.2 0 It has been held repeatedly that
a government job is not the property of the holder, 2' but rather, it
is a privilege conferred upon such holder by the state.2 2 The state
may impose reasonable conditions upon the privilege of public employment.2 3 Statutes in various jurisdictions have set up certain
16 E.g., N.Y. PEN. LAW § 2446 (waiver of immunity); N.Y. CONsT. art. I,
§ 6; N.Y.C. CHARTER § 903 (Tanzer 1937) (make waiver a condition of
employment).
17See Note, Claim of Immunity From Self-Incrimination by Public Officers,

64 U.S.L. Rv. 561, 561-62 (1930).
ISFuND FoR THE REPUBLIC, DIGEST OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OF COMmUNISM
IN THE UNITED STATES 39 (1955):
19 CUSHMAN, LEADING CONSTTUTIONA.

DECISIONS 95 (10th ed. 1955).
See CUSHMAN, op. cit. supra note 19; Note, 38 3. CRIm. L., C. & P.S.
613, 616 (1948) ; 54 MICH. L. REv. 126, 127 (1955).
21 See, e.g., Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 (1900) ; Crenshaw v. United
States, 134 U.S. 99 (1890); In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888); Bailey v.
Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per curiam, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
22 See Board of Educ. v. Wilkinson, 125 Cal. App. 2d 100, 270 P.2d 82
(1954); Note, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 1190, 1196 (1953).
22 Canteline v. McClelan, 282 N.Y. 166, 25 N.E.2d 972 (1940); Lerner v.
Casey, 2 A.D.2d 1, 154 N.Y.S.2d 461 (2d Dep't 1956); Steinmetz v.
California State Bd. of Educ., 271 P.2d 614 (1954), aff'd, 44 Cal. 2d 816, 285
P.2d 617 (1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 915 (1956) ; McAuliffe v. New Bedford,
155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892). "There are few employments for hire in
which the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional rights of free
speech as well as of idleness by the implied terms of his contract. The servant
cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are offered
20

19561

NOTES

qualifications on the holding of government office and provide for
vacatur of office in the event these conditions are broken. 24 Thus,
where the public officer accepts another office during his term of
office, 25 or refuses to file the official oath required by statute,29 automatic dismissal results. Similarly, other statutes provide for vacatur
where the office holder is adjudicated insane 2 7 or convicted of a
felony.2 8 The apparent reasonableness of these qualifications is perhaps responsible for their failure to raise any serious constitutional
questions.
More controversial have been governmental attempts to restrict
the constitutional rights of public employees. The first such attempts
took the form of restrictions on the ownership of property. 29 In
3
Ex parte Curtis,
" the Supreme Court upheld the validity of a federal
statute which punished by dismissal the requesting, giving to, or receiving of money or property for political purposes from any other
federal officer by an officer of the United States. Some years later,
the same Court upheld the constitutionality of a state statute which
imposed the penalty of discharge upon a state railroad commissioner,
who, in violation of the statute, acquired the stocks or bonds of any
railroad company. 31 The Court said:
'... [I]t could only be in very exceptional circumstances that this court would
feel justified in saying that there had been a failure of due legal process. We
might ourselves have pursued a different course . . . but that is not the test.
The plaintiff . . . must have been deprived of one of those fundamental rights,

him. On the same principle the city may impose any reasonable condition upon
holding offices within its control." McAuliffe v. New Bedford, supra at 517-18.
"It is a question of power. The People had the power to accomplish that which
in plain words they said they wished to accomplish. They are sovereign ...
They have the power, by a constitution, to set conditions, with which there
must be compliance, if one is to be or continue to be a public officer." Canteline
v. McClelan,
supra at 171, 25 N.E.2d at 974.
24
E.g., N.Y. PUB. OFFicERs LAW § 30 (Supp. 1956); id. § 35-a; N.Y.C.
CHARTER § 895 (Tanzer 1937) ; ARiz. CODE ANN. § 70-138 (Supp. 1952) ; CAL.
EDUC. CODE ANN. § 12601 (West 1955); CAL. Gov. CODE ANN. §§ 1020, 1021,
10282 5 (West 1955); LA. REv. STAT. § 14:362 (Supp. 1955).
E.g., N.Y.C. CHARTER § 895 (Tanzer 1937).
2
6 E.g., N.Y. PUB. OFFiCEcs LAW § 30(h) (Supp. 1956).
27
1d. § 30(f).
28 Id. § 30(e), Davis v. Impelliteri, 197 Misc. 162, 94 N.Y.S.2d 159 (Sup.
Ct. 1950) (construing the predecessor statute); CAL Gov. CODE ANN. § 1028
(West 1955).
29 In 1789 the first session of Congress passed a statute which made it unlawful for certain officers of the Treasury Department to own a vessel, purchase public lands or the public securities of the state or federal governments
or to otherwise engage in any trade or commerce. A similar provision was
enacted in 1791. Similarly, an act prohibiting members of Congress from having any interest in contracts with the United States was enacted in 1868. See

Ex Parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 372-73 (1882);
TUTIONAL DECISIONS 95 (10th ed. 1955).

CUSHMAN,

30 106 U.S. 371 (1882).
31 See Wilson v. North Carolina, 169 U.S. 586 (1898).

LEADING CoNsT-
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the observance of which is indispensable to the liberty df the citizen, to justify
our interference.' 82

Another instance in which the rights of government employees
have been restricted, is in the area of political activities. Ever since
Mr. Justice Holmes pointed out that "the petitioner [a policeman]
may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman," 33 it seems to be well settled that a
government may reasonably restrict the political activities of its employees as a condition of employment.3 4 This principle was recently
reinforced in United Public Workers v. Mitchell.3" There, certain
employees of the executive branch of the federal government sued to
enjoin the Civil Service Commission from enforcing against them
Section 9(a) of the Hatch Act and for a declaratory judgment that
the section was unconstitutional. Section 9(a) forbids such employees
from taking "any active part in political management or in political
campaigns" 36 at the risk of loss of employment. The Court, in upholding the constitutionality of the Act, pointed out that:
. . . [The] fundamental human rights [guaranteed by the first, fifth, ninth and

tenth amendments] are not absolute . . . [and] this Court must balance the
extent of the guarantees of freedom against a congressional enactment to
supposed evil of political partisanship
protect a democratic society against the
37
by classified employees of government.

Furthermore, since the holding of a government office is neither
"life, liberty or property" within the meaning of the due process clause,
a quasi-judicial hearing would appear to be unnecessary in affecting
a dismissal for a condition broken.3 8 Indeed, the Lloyd-La Follette
Act,3 9 in effect since 1912, provides that "no examination of witnesses
nor any trial or hearing shall be required except in the discretion of
the officer . . . directing the removal .... ," 40

Neither is the mere

dismissal of a government employee "punishment," 41 which can lawfully be inflicted only by complying with the provisions of the sixth
32
Id.at
33

594.
McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
34 See United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); McAuliffe
v. New Bedford, supra note 33; McCrory v. Philadelphia, 345 Pa. 154, 27 A.2d
55 35
(1942).
Supra note 34.
3618 U.S.C. §61(h) (Supp. V 1947).
37 United Public Workers v. Mitchell, supra note 34, at 95-96.
38 See Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per
curiam, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
3937
STAT. 555 (1912), 5 U.S.C. §§ 631-79 (1952).
40

Id.§ 652.

Bailey v. Richardson, supra note 38, at 55-56. See Finkelhor and Stockdale,
The Professor and the Fifth Amendment, 16 U. PiTr. L. Rav. 344, 345-46
(1955); cf. Blackwell, When Lawyers Plead the Fifth Amendment-The ABA
Position,27 N.Y. BAR Bu. .247, 248 (1955). But see United States v. Lovett,
328 U.S. 303 (1946).
41

NOTES
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amendment. 42 Thus, it would seem, that an employee in a dismissal
proceeding is neither entitled to trial by jury, confrontation of wit43
nesses or the assistance of counsel as guaranteed by this amendment.
As pointed out by a federal court in Bailey v. Richardson," "to hold
office at the will of a superior and to be removable therefrom only by
process of law are opposite and inherently conconstitutional due
45
flicting ideas."

Dismissal for Refusal to Testify-Generally
Before considering the problem of dismissing public employees
on the ground of refusal to testify it may be worthwhile to point out
that disbarment of attorneys for the same reason presents an excellent
analogy. Though not strictly a public employee, an attorney is an
officer of the court and as such subject to its discipline. 46 Invocation
of the privilege against self-incrimination in response to charges regarding the attorney's loyalty is said to be in conflict with the oath
taken by an attorney upon admission to the bar.47 Thus, disbarment
has resulted by viewing the refusial to testify both as an inference of
guilt 4 8 or as sufficient cause in itself for revocation of his license. 49
That an attorney's invoking of the privilege presents considerations
similar to the manifestation of like conduct by public employees has
recently been rejected, however, in Sheiner v. State.50 There, a
Florida court pointed out that an attorney's ". . . position is not in
the class with that of the teacher, the police officer, the security risk
or others in public employment," 5' and thus refused to discipline an
attorney who had refused to testify before a federal congressional
committee.
In various jurisdictions, courts have upheld the dismissal of
policemen 32 and public school teachers 5a without any express statu42 Bailey v. Richardson, supra note 38, at 55-56; accord, Wilson v. North
Carolina, 169 U.S. 586 (1898).
43 U.S. CotsT. amend. VI.
44 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per curiam, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).

45 Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per curiam,
341 U.S. 918 (1951).
4 See Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal. *293, *314-15 (1863); Welanko's Case, 99
N.H. 413, 112 A.2d 50 (1955) (per curiam).
47 See Note, Use of the Fifth Amendment by an Attorney as Groumds for

Disbarment, 31 NoTRE

DAME

LAW. 465, 466-67 (1956).

48 See In re Fenn, 235 Mo. App. 24, 128 S.W.2d 657 (1939)
49 See Welanko's Case, supra note 46.

(per curiam).

5 82 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1955).
51 Sheiner v. State, 82 So. 2d 657, 662 (Fla. 1955).
52 See Christal v. Police Comm'n, 33 Cal. App. 2d 564, 92 P2d 416 (1939);
Souder v. Philadelphia, 305 Pa. 1, 156 Atl. 245 (1931); accord, Drury v.
Hurley, 339 Ill. App. 33, 88 N.E.2d 728 (1949).
53 See Davis v. University of Kansas City, 129 F. Supp. 716 (W.D. Mo.
1955) ; Board of Educ. v. Eisenberg, 129 Cal. App. 2d 732, 277 P.2d 943 (1954) ;
Board of Educ. v. Wilkinson, 125 Cal. App. 2d 100, 270 P.2d 82 (1954); Faxon
v. School Comm., 331 Mass. 531, 120 N.E.2d 772 (1954).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 31

tory authority. In the case of policemen, a refusal to testify has been
viewed both as "conduct unbecoming an officer" 54 and a breach of
duty,55 thus justifying a discharge. In the leading case of Christal v.
Police Commission,56 the petitioning police officers had refused to
produce records or testify before a grand jury investigating their alleged taking of bribes. Pursuant to a departmental rule they were
discharged for "conduct unbecoming an officer" and immediately instituted court action claiming that their removal had been both unconstitutional and unjustified. In the light of both the departmental rule
and the constitutional privilege the court viewed the situation as giving rise to a voluntary choice. The court pointed out that whereas
duty required them to answer, privilege permitted a refusal. The
exercise of the privilege, however, was wholly inconsistent with their
duty as police officers. In affirming their right to exercise the privilege, the court rejected the notion that
they could, at the same time,
57
insist upon retaining their positions.
Very recently, the Supreme Court of the United States appears
to have adopted this view. In Orloff v. Willoughby,5" that Court
had before it for decision a case involving the withholding of an
officer's commission by the Army to one who had been inducted as a
physician under a special conscription statute because he had invoked
the privilege in refusing to answer questions regarding alleged Communist Party membership. The physician claimed he was being punished for exercising a privilege which the constitution guarantees and
sought to compel the Army to either discharge him or grant him a
commission. The Court, denying the petition, stated:
No one, at least no one on this Court which has repeatedly sustained
assertions by Communists of the privilege against self-incrimination, questions
or doubts Orloff's right to withhold facts about himself on this ground. No
one believes he can be punished for doing so. But the question is whether he
can at the same time take the position that to tell the truth about himself
might incriminate him and that even so the President must appoint him to a
54 Christal v. Police Comm'n, supra note 52; Souder v. Philadelphia, supra

note 52.

55 Christal v. Police Comm'n, supra note 52; Drury v. Hurley, supra note 52,
at 735 (dictum) ; Scholl v. Bell, 125 Ky. 750, 102 S.W. 248, 261-62 (1907)
(dictum).
96 See Christal v. Police Comm'n, 33 Cal. App. 2d 564, 92 P.2d 416 (1939).
57 This principle was clearly stated by the trial judge in the Sheiner case
(see text at note 50) where a Florida attorney was disbarred for refusing to
testify in regard to charges affecting his loyalty. The court pointed out that
Sheiner ".

.

. emerged from the court room with the right guaranteed him by

the Fifth Amendment unimpaired, but he left divested of the privilege to practice law .... He has protected himself by invoking the Fifth Amendment, we
shall protect ourselves by invoking the State's right to withdraw from him the
privilege which he has abused." Quoted in Blackwell, When Lawtyers Plead
the Fifth Amendment-The ABA Position,27 N.Y. BAR BULL. 247, 251 (1955).
On appeal, the Sheiner case was reversed. See Sheiner v. State, 82 So. 2d 657
(Fla. 1955).
58 345 U.S. 83 (1953).
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post of honor and trust. We have no hesitation in answering that question
'No.' 59
The dismissal of public school teachers who invoke the privilege
seems to be a product of the extensive loyalty investigations inaugurated in recent years. In addition to "conduct unbecoming a
teacher" 00 and breach of duty, 61 the exercise of the privilege by a
teacher in response to questions relating to Communist Party membership has been held "adequate cause" 02 for discharge. It has been
said that "the public will .

.

. and ...

ought not ...

stand, for such

reticence or refusals to answer by the teachers in their schools." Cs
A refusal to answer questions touching upon a teacher's loyalty to
the country which permits him to teach tends to weaken the confidence placed in him by his students and the institution which employs
him. In addition, it disparages the whole profession in the eyes of
the public and thus, would seem to justify his dismissal.0 4 Certainly,
the inconsistency betveen a public school teacher's duty and his right
not to incriminate himself with respect to membership in disloyal
organizations is at least as great as in the instance 5of a policeman who
asserts similar rights in regard to other activities.
If public employees may be removed from office for refusing to
testify before legally authorized bodies in regard to their official conduct in the absence of statute, express enactments clearly defining the
conduct which will result in discharge would appear to be all the more
justified. At least four jurisdictions have enacted such statutes. 6
The Louisiana statute 67 is patterned after Section 903 of the New
York City Charter. It is applicable to all employees of the cities of
Louisiana as well as employees of the state or political subdivisions
thereof. Under it, a refusal to testify regarding the affairs or government of the city or the conduct of any city officer before any court
or body authorized to conduct any hearing or inquiry will subject the
offender to a forfeiture of his government office. However, unlike
59
60 Id. at 91.
Board of Educ. v. Wilkinson, 125 Cal. App. 2d 100, 270 P.2d 82 (1954);
Faxon v. School Comm., 331 Mass. 531, 120 N.E.2d 772 (1954).
01
Faxon v. School Comm., suspra note 60.
62
Davis v. University of Kansas City, 129 F. Supp. 716 (W.D. Mo. 1955);
Board of Educ. v. Eisenberg, 129 Cal. App. 2d 732, 277 P.2d 943 (1954).
63 Davis v. University of Kansas City, supra note 62 at 718.
64 See Wyman, The Fifth Amendment: The Case of the Three Professors,
41 A.B.A.J. 801, 803-04 (1955).
65 See Faxon v. School Comm., 331 Mass. 531, 120 N.E.2d 772, 775 (1954).
66 N.Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 6; N.Y.C. CHARTM § 903 (Tanzer 1937); CAL.
Gov. CODE ANx. § 1028.1 (West 1955); LA. REv. STAr. § 33:2426 (1950). In
addition, under an Executive Order issued in 1953, the exercise of the privilege
by any employee of the executive department may be considered as a factor in
determining whether the employee constitutes a "security risk." Exec. Order
No. 10450, 18 FED. REG. 2489 (1953), as amended, Exec. Order No. 10491,
18 FED.
REG. 6583 (1953).
67
LA. REv. STAT. § 33:2426 (1950).
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its New York City counterpart, which bars the holding of office permanently, it proscribes the holding of any city 68 job for a period of
only two years. 69 On the other hand, the California statute 70 is much
more limited. It appears to be applicable only before administrative
boards and legislative committees though it does contain an express
provision extending its applicability to refusals to testify before federal legislative committees. The most distinguishing feature of the
California statute, however, is that dismissal is predicated on a refusal
to answer questions relating to only four activities specified therein.
All these questions relate to past and present disloyal advocacy or
membership in subversive organizations. 71 In Steinmetz v. California
State Board of Education,72 the court upheld the constitutionality of
the statute. There, the court pointed out that the dismissal had not
been predicated on a presumption that the activity inquired of was
true, but on a refusal to answer questions relating thereto. It was further held that the fact that the questions asked might tend to incriminate if answered, did not divest the state of the power to require
an answer as a condition of employment.
Section 903-New York City Charter
Pursuant to legislative authorization, 73 the New York City

Charter was adopted by the people of that city at the general election
held in 1936 and became effective January 1, 1938.74 Section 903 75
68 Though the statute purports to apply to state and county as well as city
employees, it inconsistently purports to bar the offender from holding any city
job for 2 years. Ibid.
69 Compare LA. REv. STAT. § 33:2426 (1950), with N.Y.C. CHARTER § 903

(Tanzer 1937).
70 CAL. Gov. CODE ANN. § 1028.1 (West 1955).
711
The statute directs the employee to answer questions relating to
"(a) Present personal advocacy by the employee of the forceful or violent
overthrow of the Government of the United States or of any state.
(b) Present knowing membership in any organization now advocating the
forceful or violent overthrow of the Government of the United States or of
any state.
(c) Past knowing membership at any time since September 10, 1948, in
any organization which, to the knowledge of such employee's, during the time
of the employees membership advocated the forceful or violent overthrow of
the Government of the United States or of any state.
(d) Questions as to present knowing membership of such employee in the
Communist Party or as to past knowing membership in the Communist Party
at any time since September 10, 1948." Ibid.
72271 P.2d 614 (1954), aff'd, 44 Cal. 2d 816, 285 P.2d 617 (1955), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 915 (1956).
73 Laws of N.Y. 1934, c. 867.
74
TANZER, NEW YORK CITY CHARTER 1 (1937).
75 "If any councilman or other officer or employee of the city shall, after
lawful notice or process, wilfully refuse or fail to appear before any court or
judge, any legislative committee, or any officer, board or body authorized to
conduct any hearing or inquiry, or having appeared shall refuse to testify or

1956 ]

NOTES

was included as a measure aimed at the elimination of graft and corruption as a result of recommendations made in the Seabury Report. 78
The section is applicable to all officers and employees of New York
City. The conduct proscribed includes the failure or refusal to appear,
testify or waive immunity before any court, grand jury, legislative
committee or administrative body. The questions asked or the investigation undertaken, however, must relate to either the government,
property and affairs of the city, or the official conduct of any employee
thereof. Violation of the statute results in vacatur of office plus permanent proscription from holding any other city office by appointment
or election, i.e., the employee is not only automatically dismissed from
his present position but becomes thereafter ineligible to hold any other
city job.
Though framed in broad language, the statute is limited in a few
important aspects. Thus, it has been held that Section 903 is inapplicable where the conduct proscribed is not engaged in before the
body conducting the investigation.77 Similarly, the section is not applicable where the employee is guilty of perjury. 78 Finally, the fact
that admissions of guilt in answer to the questions posed do not give
rise to an operation of the statute 79 points up the purpose of the
statute, which is to induce answers to pertinent questions in order to
supply needed information to legally authorized bodies.
Similar in purpose and effect to Section 903 is Article I, Section
6 of the New York State Constitution."0 This provision, however,
to answer any question regarding the property, government or affairs of the
city or of any county included within its territorial limits, or regarding the
nomination, election, appointment or official conduct of any officer or employee
of the city or of any such county, on the ground that his answer would tend
to incriminate him, or shall refuse to waive immunity from prosecution on
account of any such matter in relation to which he may be asked to testify
upon any such hearing or inquiry, his term or tenure of office or employment
shall terminate and such office or employment shall be vacant, and he shall
not be eligible to election or appointment to any office or employment under the
city or any agency." N.Y.C. CHARTER § 903 (Tanzer 1937).

76 See Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 564-65 (1956)
(dissenting opinion); see also Waldman, The Fifth Amendment-Shield or

Sword, 7

BROOKLYx BARR.

113, 115 (1956).

Crane v. Monaghan, 124 N.Y.S.2d 26 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
Daniman v. Board of Educ., 306 N.Y. 532, 538, 119 N.E.2d 373, 377 (1954)
(dictum), appeal denied, 348 U.S. 933 (1955). See People v. Schappes, 291
N.Y. 575, 50 N.E.2d 821 (mern. opinion), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 790 (1943),
where a city employee was convicted of perjury for falsely testifying in regard
to his official conduct.
79 Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., supra note 76, at 565 (dissenting
opinion); Daniman v. Board of Educ., supra note 78 (dictum).
80 ".. [A]ny public officer who, upon being called before a grand jury to
testify concerning the conduct of his office or the performance of his official
duties, refuses to sign a waiver of immunity against subsequent criminal prosecution, or to answer any relevant question concerning such matters before such
grand jury, shall by virtue of such refusal, be disqualified from holding any
other public office or public employment for a period of five years, and shall
77

78
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is limited to instances where a public officer invokes the privilege
against self-incrimination before a grand jury only. Also, the state
constitutional provision lacks the permanent proscription from office
feature of its New York City Charter counterpart. The resulting
weakness of a statute lacking such provision was demonstrated in
People v. Harris."' There, the New York Court of Appeals upheld
the immediate reappointment to another office involving similar duties
of a public employee who had violated the constitutional provision.
This weakness was partly remedied, however, when the provision was
to make a violator ineligible for office for a period of five
amended
82
years.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 903 the New York courts
have sustained the dismissal of firemen 83 and teachers 84 as well as
other employees 85 found guilty of the conduct proscribed therein.
The question of whether the charter provision is applicable to teachers
in the New York City schools, however, has been subject to serious
controversy.8 6 It has been argued that teachers are not city but state
employees, but since their salaries are paid out of funds in the city
treasury, they are within the definition of the term as contained in
the Administrative Code.8 7 Thus, they have been held city employees
by the New York courts.8 8 Under the Education Law a teacher,
after acquiring "tenure" 89 may only be removed from his position for
four specified causes 90 and after notice and hearing.91 It has been
be removed from office by the appropriate authority or shall forfeit his office
at the suit of the attorney-general." N.Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 6.
81294 N.Y. 424, 63 N.E.2d 17 (1945).

82 Laws of N.Y. 1949, p. 1951.

Approved by vote of people November 8,

1949.

83 Crane v. Monaghan, 283 App. Div. 785, 129 N.Y.S.2d .229 (1st Dep't
1954)
(mem. opinion), aff'd mem., 308 N.Y. 880, 126 N.E.2d 312 (1955).
8
4 Daniman v. Board of Educ., 306 N.Y. 532, 119 N.E.2d 373 (1954), appeal

denied, 348 U.S. 933 (1955); Goldway v. Board of Higher Educ., 178 Misc.

1023, 37 N.Y.S.2d 34 (Sup. Ct. 1942); Withrow v. Joint Legislative Comm.,
176 Misc. 597, 602, 28 N.Y.S.2d 223, 228 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (dictum).
85 Koral v. Board of Educ., 197 Misc. 221, 94 N.Y.S.2d 378 (Sup. Ct. 1950)
(mechanical engineer); accord, Lerner v. Casey, 138 N.Y.S.2d 777 (Sup. Ct.
1955), af'd, 2 A.D.2d 1, 154 N.Y.S.2d 461 (2d Dep't 1956) (dismissal of a
subway conductor §ustained on ground that Section 903 was expressive of the
public policy of the state).
86 See Waldman, The Fifth Amendment-Shield or Sword, 7 BROOKLYN
BARR. 113, 114-15 (1956).
87 The Administrative Code defines an employee as "Any person whose
salary in whole or in part is paid out of the city treasury." N.Y.C. ADmIN.
CODE § 981-1.0(7).
88 Daniman v. Board of Educ., supra note 84; Goldway v. Board of Higher
Educ., supra note 84; accord, Koral v. Board of Educ., supra note 85.
89 " 'Tenure' shall mean the right of a person to hold his position during
good behavior and efficient and competent service, and not to be removed there" N.Y. Evuc. LAW § 6206(1) (d).
from except for cause ...
90

o d. § 6206(10).

91 Ibid.
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held, however, that there is no conflict between these provisions and
Section 903. 92 It is reasoned'that while the sections in the Education
Law govern the removal of teachers for cause generally,93the Charter
provides for a forfeiture of office for a particular cause.
In defense to the application of Section 903 to teachers who invoke the privilege when asked questions regarding their membership
in the Communist Party, it has been pointed out that other statutes
specifically deal with the removal of disloyal teachers. For example,
Section 3021 of the Education Law provides for the removal of a
teacher found guilty of seditious conduct. 94 Section 12 -a of the Civil
Service Law disqualifies from public employment any person who
advocates the overthrow of government by force or violence. 95 Section 3022 of the Education Law, which is part of the Feinberg Law,
makes membership in any organization advocating the conduct proscribed by the two proceeding statutes, prinuz facie evidence of disqualification for office.90 Furthermore, Sections 25 and 26-a of the
Civil Service Law forbid the asking of questions concerning the political beliefs and associations of Civil Service employees to determine
their fitness to hold office. 97 Dismissing this argument, however,
Adler v. Wilson,9" held that these statutes do not affect a disciplinary
proceeding brought against a teacher for failure to answer questions
regarding Communist Party membership. The court there added,
that the provisions in the Civil Service Law prohibiting the asking
of questions regarding an employee's political beliefs and associations
were not applicable to Communist Party membership. 99
Another argument on behalf of the teacher is that his automatic
dismissal for exercising a constitutional right violates the basic principle of academic freedom. Under this principle, a teacher acquiring
"tenure" is removable only if found to be incompetent, upon conviction of a serious crime, or so morally delinquent as to be unfit for
association with students. 100 Academic freedom has been described
as the "freedom to follow one's conscience within the law." 101 Con92

Daniman v. Board of Educ., 306 N.Y. 532, 119 N.E.2d 373 (1954), appeal

denied, 348 U.S. 933 (1955) ; accord, Koral v. Board of Educ., 197 Misc. 221,
94 N.Y.S.2d 378 (Sup. Ct 1950).
93 See Daniman v. Board of Educ., supra note 92, at 539-40, 119 N.E.2d at
378.
94 N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 3021.
95
N.Y. Civ. SEuv. LAw § 12 -a.
96 N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 3022.
N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW §§ 25, 26-a.
98 282 App. Div. 418, 123 N.Y.S.2d 655 (3d Dep't 1953).
99 Adler v. Wilson, 282 App. Div. 418, 123 N.Y.S.2d 655 (3d Dep't 1953).
100 Byse, Teachers and the Fifth Amendment, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 871, 879
97

(1954).

A University "'.

.

. is not and must not become an aggregation of

like-minded people all behaving according to approved convention. It is a
temple of the open-minded. And so long as in his instruction, his scholarship,

his relations with his associates and juniors a teacher maintains candor, and
truth as he sees it, he may not be required to pass any other test.'" Id. at 882.
20, Id. at 879.
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ceding that freedom, doesn't a teacher and his profession have at least
as great an obligation to set an example of patriotism and loyalty to
country, as to defend the right to freedom of thought and expression? 102 As was pointed out by a New York court, "academic
freedom . . . is the freedom to do good and not to teach evil." 103
Finally, it is claimed that a teacher may be morally justified in
invoking the privilege.10 4 Though he be innocent of any charge directed to him, the teacher may be unwilling to implicate others or may
have exercised the privilege by mistake, inadvertence or because
he followed erroneous legal advice. Assuming the validity of this
argument, it is equally certain that the state is morally justified in
dismissing him, since, when questioned regarding his loyalty, a teacher
who invokes the privilege tends to weaken the confidence reposed in
him by his students and to subvert the character of the whole profession in the eyes of the public. 105 Notwithstanding any of these
arguments, however, the New York courts have consistently held
Section 903 applicable to teachers. 10 6
The broad terms of the charter provision have provided an
opportunity for the courts to hold it applicable to testimony before
federal legislative committees. 10 7 Furthermore, the view has been
taken that questions regarding alleged subversive activities of employees are inquiries into his official conduct. 10 8 As interpreted by
the New York courts, the provision, insofar as it effects a termination
of employment, is self-executing. 0 9 Thus, "the assertion of the
privilege against self incrimination is equivalent to a resignation." 110
Since the act which gives rise to the vacatur of office is either admitted or a matter of public record, it has been pointed out that there
is no necessity for notice and hearing in effecting a dismissal."' In
upholding Section 903 as a reasonable condition imposed by a city
upon the holding of an office within its control, the New York courts
have expressed the view that the charter
provision violates neither
2
the state nor federal constitution."
102 See Life, May 21, 1956, p. 44.
03

1

Kay v. Board of Higher Educ., 173 Misc. 943, 951, 18 N.Y.S.2d 821, 829

(Sup. Ct), af'd mem., 259 App. Div. 879, 20 N.Y.S2d 1016 (1st Dept 1940).
104 See GRxswou, THE FIFrH AMENDMENT TODAY (1955); Byse, supra note
100; Life, May 21; 1956, p. 44.
105 See Wyman, The Fifth Amendment: The Case of the Three Professors,
41 A.B.A.J. 801, 803-04 (1955).
100 See note 84 supra.
107 See cases
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.

cited note 92 supra.

10 Daniman v. Board of Educ., 306 N.Y. 532, 538, 119 N.E.2d 373, 377
(1954), appeal dismissed,\348 U.S. 933 (1955).
111 See Koral v. Board of Educ., 197 Misc. 221, 224, 94 N.Y.S2d 378, 382

(Sup. Ct 1950).

112 See Shlakman v. Board of Higher Educ., 307 N.Y. 806, 121 N.E2d 629,
amending 306 N.Y. 532, 119 N.E.2d 373 (1954), reV'd sub nom., Slochower v.
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The Slochower Case

But the Supreme Court of the United States is of a different
view. In Slochower v. Board of Higher Education,"3 the question
of the constitutionality of Section 903 came before that Court for
decision for the first time. Slochower was an associate professor at
Brooklyn College, an institution maintained by the City of New York.
He had invoked the privilege against self-incrimination before a committee of the United States Senate in response to questions concerning his past membership in the Communist Party. Shortly thereafter,
his position was declared vacant pursuant to Section 903 of the
Charter. Seeking reinstatement, Professor Slochower challenged the
validity of the charter provision on the ground that it violated due
process. The Court held that the summary dismissal of the petitioner, under the circumstances, violated due process of law.
Mr. Justice Clark, speaking for the majority, stated:
At the outset we must condemn the practice of imputing a sinister meaning
11 4
to the exercise of a person's constitutional right under the Fifth Amendment.
The Court construed the statute as converting an exercise of the
privilege by city employees into a conclusive presumption of guilt and
pointed out that "the privilege . . . would be reduced to a hollow
mockery if its exercise could be taken as equivalent either to a confession of guilt or a conclusive presumption of perjury." 15 It was
felt that summary dismissal of a public employee under these circumstances was arbitrary action of a kind which the due process clause
was meant to prevent.
In Adler v. Board of Education," 6 the Court had upheld a New
York statute which authorized the school authorities to dismiss employees who, after notice and hearing, were found to advocate the
forceful overthrow of government or could not satisfactorily explain
membership in organizations with that purpose. It was said there
that "one's associates, past and present, as well as one's conduct, may
properly be considered in determining fitness and loyalty." 17 In
Garner v. Board of Public Works," 8 the Court upheld the power of
a city to discharge employees who refused to file an affidavit disclosing past and present knowing membership in the Communist
Party. In Wieman v. Updegraff, 9° however, they struck down an
Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Goldway v. Board of Higher
Educ., 178 Misc. 1023, 37 N.Y.S.2d 34 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
"13350 U.S. 551 (1956).
114 Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 557 (1956).
I Ibid.

116 342 U.S. 485 (1952).

117 Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952).
118341 US. 716 (1951).

I's344 U.S. 183 (1952).
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Oklahoma statute which required as a condition of employment, the
furnishing of a "loyalty oath" by public employees in which a denial
of membership in certain organizations for the preceding five years
had to be included. The Court there pointed out that the statute did
not distinguish between innocent and knowing membership and thus
resulted in an arbitrary classification. That case established the
proposition that ".

.

. constitutional protection does extend to the

public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory." 120
In the
remarked:

Garner case

Mr. Justice Frankfurter,

concurring,

It would give to the Due Process Clause an unwarranted power of intrusion into local affairs to hold that a city may not require its employees to
disclose whether they have been members of the Communist Party. ...121

In Slochower the Court, pointing to the fact that the discharge had
been based solely on events occurring before a federal congressional
committee, distinguished the Garner case on the ground that there
the city itself was seeking the information the employees refused to
furnish. Mr. Justice Reed, who dissented, however, while conceding
this fact, pointed out that Section 903 ".

.

. is directed at the pro-

priety of employing a man who refuses to give needed information
to appropriate public bodies." 122
Nevertheless, the result of the decided cases seems to be that
while state or local governments may require their employees to furnish information regarding the employee's knowing membership in
subversive organizations as a condition of employment, it may not
summarily discharge an employee who refuses to furnish the same
information to a body charged with the primary duty to elicit it.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court's conclusion that Professor Slochower's dismissal had violated due process of law appears to be based on the view
that inherent in Section 903 is an implied presumption of guilt arising
from the witness' refusal to testify. But the New York Court of
Appeals had nof placed this construction on the statute. In fact, it
had expressly stated that it did not presume that Slochower, by his
action, had ". . . shown cause to be discharged under the Feinberg
Law . . .since no inference of membership in the Communist Party

may be drawn from the assertion of one's privilege against self
120 Wiemann v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, 192 (1952).
121 Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716, 725 (1950)
(concurring
opinion).
122 Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 562 (1956)
(dissenting opinion).
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incrimination." 123 Therefore, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Harlan
in dissent, "since § 903 is inoperative if even incriminating answers
are given, it is apparent that it is the exercise of the privilege itself
which is the basis for the discharge, quite apart from any inference
of guilt." 124 Thus, though it may well be that to punish by dismissal
the exercise of the privilege by a public employee in response to questions relating to his official conduct violates due process, the Supreme
Court never reached this question.
Furthermore, it is not clear from the opinion what the status of
Section 903, from a constitutional point of view, is today. Either
the Court meant to hold the charter provision invalid in all cases, or
merely where the privilege is exercised before federal investigative
bodies. Clarification of this question and the more fundamental one
of whether a state may constitutionally use the invocation of the
privilege as a basis for dismissal must await future consideration by
the Court. In the meantime, the Slochower case has created confusion in this area of the law. As pointed out previously, the Court
has upheld restrictions on the exercise by government employees 1of
25
rights guaranteed by the first, fifth, and fourteenth amendments.
While it is not denied that the exercise of the fifth amendment privilege is a right which cannot be denied any citizen, is the privilege
against self-incrimination more sacred than other analogous constitutional guarantees? 126

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN

THE LAW OF MOTION PICTURE

CENSORSHIP

The Mutual Cases
Censorship of motion pictures originated as the state's answer
to an urgent need. During its infancy, the movie industry harbored
many shoestring operations concerned with quick profits by means of
' 23

Daniman v. Board of Educ., 306 N.Y. 532, 538, 119 N.E2d 373, 377

(1954), appeal denied, 348 U.S. 933 (1955).
124 Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., supra note 122, at 565 (dissenting
opinion). See also Daniman v. Board of Educ., supra note 123; cf. Steinmetz
v. State Bd. of Educ., 271 P.2d 614 (1954), aff'd, 44 Cal. 2d 816, 285 P.2d 617
(1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 915 (1956).
125 See text at notes 29-37.
126 "As no constitutional guarantee enjoys preference, so none should suffer
subordination or deletion." Frankfurter, J., Ullmann v. United States, 350

U.S. 422, 428 (1956).

".

.

. [i1t seems to us that the question [of restricting

the constitutional rights of governmental employees] is practically settled in
the Federal field by [the] United Public Workers . . . [case]. We do not see
that the right not to incriminate oneself stands on any higher ground in a
democracy than the right to take an active part in elections." Faxon v. School
Comm., 331 Mass. 531, 120 N.E2d 772, 775 (1954).

